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Rudolf Carnap’s Der logische Aufbau der Welt is considered to be 
the magnum opus of (early) analytic philosophy. Contrary to this 
analytic tradition stands, as the saying goes, everything else – the 
so called continental philosophies.  It has been highlighted recently, 
however, that the contexts of the Aufbau differ radically from the usual 
received view. In order to obtain a better picture of (the influences 
of) the Aufbau, I will present in Sect. 1 the received view which 
characterizes the book as a reductive empiricist, foundationalist 
and phenomenalist work. In Sect. 2 I will show step-by-step that 
this view is mistaken and the influences on the Aufbau could be 
located around Neo-Kantianism, the philosophy of Husserl and the 
human sciences [Geisteswissenschaften]. The contribution of this 
paper is connected to these approaches and argues for a different 
and currently unanalyzed and mainly ignored aspect of Carnap’s 
work, namely his theory of geistige Gegenstände. After all, I will 
claim that the motivations and continental roots of the Aufbau are 
just much deeper than it is usually thought.
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Rudolf Carnap’s early major work1, Der logische Aufbau der Welt,2 is 
considered to be the magnum opus of (early) analytic philosophy. 
Seemingly it instantiates every features of it: precise argumenta-
tion, rigorous concept usage, radical empiricism, anti-metaphysi-
cal and anti-historical basic stance and formal logical treatment of 
classical problems. This attitude and style contrast the work with 
the so-called continental philosophies. One could say that if analytic 
philosophy is to be characterized with one work – as opposed to the 
continental tradition – it is the Aufbau.
We have, however, very good reasons to think otherwise. The 
origins of the work, as well as the published material, are just more 
complex and cannot be approached from the perspective of one or 
two general tendencies. In order to facilitate our understanding of 
Carnap’s philosophy in the Aufbau, I will overview the general (or 
received) reading of the book in Section 1. After that, in Section 
2, I shall focus on those doubts and alternative traditions which 
undermine the main theses of the received view. At the end, our 
attention will be focused on a new and hitherto mostly unanalyzed 
aspect of the book, namely on Carnap’s relation to the human sci-
ences [Geisteswissenschaften]. The thesis which is supposed to be 
defended all along the way is that the motivations and continental 
roots of the Aufbau go much deeper than they are usually thought.
1 During my research connected to the basic idea of the paper I got many 
important and fruitful questions and suggestions (and also some unpublished 
manuscripts). I am indebted to André Caurs, Hans-Joachim Dahms, Christian 
Damböck, István Faragó-Szabó, Megyer Gyöngyösi, Thomas Mormann and 
Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock. I am also indebted to the Carnap Archives at 
Los Angeles (Rudolf Carnap papers (Collection 1029). UCLA Library Special 
Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library) and at Pittsburgh (Rudolf Carnap 
Papers, 1905-1970, ASP.1974.01, Special Collections Department, University of 
Pittsburgh) for the permission to quote the archive materials. All rights reserved. 
I cite the Pittsburgh Archive as follows: ASP RC XX-YY-ZZ, where XX is the box 
number, YY the folder number, and ZZ the item number. The present study is an 
extended and modified translation of my earlier Hungarian articles on Carnap. 
The research was supported by the Hungarian National Grant of Excellence.
2 Rudolf Carnap, The Logical Structure of the World (Chicago and La Salle, 
Illinois: Open Court, 1928/2005). I will refer to it as Aufbau with the number of 
the paragraphs.
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1. The Received View
I will name as the “received view” that textbook-like idea which 
characterizes the Aufbau with three “isms”: (1) empiricism, (2) 
foundationalism, (3) phenomenalism. Though the received view is 
not without reason – also Carnap seemed to strengthen this view 
from time to time retrospectively – we will see that at certain points 
it requires some completion, but at other points, it is just simply 
misleading.
1.1. The Aufbau as an empiricist work
The Aufbau is considerd to be a work in the tradition of empir-
icism. By empiricism we understand here simply that approach 
which locates the origins of our knowledge solely in our senses, in 
our experiences. In a stronger sense, one could say that for a logi-
cal empiricist only those statements are intelligible which describe 
one’s own immediate experiences, or which follow from statements 
describing one’s experiential sensations. It is usually pointed out 
that the Vienna Circle is the most famous logical empiricist group 
and Carnap is often identified with the Circle.3 Carnap’s name has 
interwoven with the Aufbau and thus (transitively) the Aufbau is 
joined with empiricism.
Quine took Carnap as an integrant part of the empiricist tradi-
tion and characterized him “[as] the first empiricist who, not con-
tent with asserting the reducibility of science to terms of immediate 
experience, took serious steps toward carrying out the reduction.”4
One should not overlook, of course, that even the logical empir-
icists made a lot to strengthen this reading of them.5 The authors 
of the Circle’s manifesto, Carnap, Hans Hahn, and Otto Neurath, 
3 Quine writes, for example, in a letter to Carnap that “Last term I gave a course 
on ‘Logical Positivism’, which is to say ‘Carnap’.” See 66/QC/1938-2-4/239.
4 W. V. O. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” in From a Logical Point of View 
(New York: Harper & Raw Publishers, 1951/1963), 39.
5 According to the received view the pre-eminent example of this is the 
reductivist verificationism of Carnap. Rudolf Carnap, “The Elimination of 
Metaphysics Through the Logical Analysis of Language,” in Logical Positivism, 
edited by Alfred J. Ayer (New York: The Free Press, 1932/1959), 60–81.
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which marks their official phase from 1929, claimed that “[w]e 
have characterized the scientific world-conception essentially by two 
features. First it is empiricist and positivist: there is knowledge only 
from experience, which rests on what is immediately given.”6 Even 
Alfred J. Ayer, who joined the meetings of the Circle for a short 
period and attended the seminars of Schlick, tried to connect the 
Vienna Circle to the heritage of Hume and Russell in his Language, 
Truth and Logic.7 Therefore, one can easily conclude that, according 
to the received view, the Aufbau and even logical empiricism, in 
general, are just modern versions of classical British empiricism.
1.2. The Aufbau as a foundationalist work
The second panel of the received view is centered on foundational-
ism. A foundationalist claims that there is a fundamental, certain, 
infallible base of knowledge on which our whole system of knowl-
edge is built on; the ontological parallel of this claim is that the 
world consists of certain basic and fundamental entities from which 
the other entities are constructed.8 The fundamentalist program in 
the modern era goes back at least to Descartes’ “cogito ergo sum” 
but it emerged also in classical empiricism where the fundamental 
elements of one’s knowledge were special ideas.
Quine and Goodman are responsible – in the United States – 
to present the Aufbau as a foundationalist work. In the former’s 
“Epistemology Naturalized” – when Quine discussed the history of 
empiricist epistemology and Carnap’s place in the story – one finds 
such passages as: “The Cartesian quest for certainty had been the 
6 Rudolf Carnap, Hans Hahn and Otto Neurath, “Scientific Conception of 
the World: The Vienna Circle,” in Empiricism and Sociology, edited by Marie 
Neurath and Robert S. Cohen (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1929/1973), 309. A similar 
reconstruction of the Circle and especially the Aufbau is given by Victor Kraft, a 
former member of the group. See Victor Kraft, Der Wiener Kreis. Der Ursprung 
des Neopositivismus (Springer-Verlag, 1950).  
7 See Alfred J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (New York: Dover Publications, 
1936/1952), 32. ff.
8 In Russell’s external-world-project the ontological and the epistemological 
points of view seem to coincide at certain points.
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remote motivation of epistemology, both on its conceptual and its 
doctrinal side; but that quest was seen as a lost cause.”9
The received view tells us that the main motivation of Carnap 
was to continue and elaborate Russell’s 1914 external-world-proj-
ect: to find that fundamental base from which our knowledge of the 
world could be built up with certainty. As the textbook story goes, 
the Aufbau as a foundationalist work was doomed to failure due to 
its logical and epistemological errors.
1.3. The Aufbau as a phenomenalist work
The third element of the received view combines the first two since 
an answer is to be provided to the question: what is that epistemo-
logical/ontological base to which an empiricist should reduce the 
complex elements of knowledge? The answer is a special form of 
phenomenalism, the theory of sense data: statements about physical 
objects could be defined by those terms that describe one’s private 
sense data. Thus, in this case, the fundament of one’s knowledge is 
formed by isolated, atomic and private sense data which could not 
be analyzed further.
According to Nelson Goodman, “[t]he system [of the Aufbau] is 
plainly phenomenalistic.”10 Phenomenalism in itself is not enough 
to characterize the system of the Aufbau; it shows only that the 
source of knowledge is located in one’s private sensations. Sense 
data theory is a special version of phenomenalism which was quite 
familiar back then. In the Vienna Circle, Ernst Mach’s sense data 
theory was referred to quite frequently but they also considered 
Carnap’s external world project as such a conception.11 On the other 
hand, Carnap emphasized the important role of Russell’s sense data 
9 W. V. O. Quine, “Epistemology Naturalized,” in Ontological Relativity and 
other Essays (Columbia University Press, 1969), 74.
10 Nelson Goodman, “The Significance of Der logische Aufbau der Welt,“ in 
The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, edited by Paul A. Schilpp (Open Court, 1963), 
545. Carnap also emphasizes this in his reply to Goodman. See Rudolf Carnap, 
“Nelson Goodman On Der logische Aufbau der Welt,” in The Philosophy of Rudolf 
Carnap, edited by Paul A. Schilpp (Open Court, 1963), 945.
11 See for example Carnap–Hahn–Neurath, “Scientific Conception…”; and Philipp 
Frank, Modern Science and its Philosophy (New York: George Braziller, 1949).
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theory and its effect on his early philosophy. In his intellectual auto-
biography, he described Russell’s project as the main source of his 
Aufbau.12 Furthermore, the motto of the Aufbau (§1) was a quota-
tion from Russell: “The supreme maxim in scientific philosophizing 
is this: Wherever possible, logical constructions are to be substi-
tuted for inferred entities.”13
Quine could be marked, at least partly, as responsible also for the 
sense data/phenomenalist reading of the Aufbau.14 Both in “Two 
Dogmas of Empiricism” and “Epistemology Naturalized” he viewed 
the Aufbau from the mentioned perspective:
Radical reductionism, conceived now with statements as units, set 
itself the task of specifying a sense-datum language and showing 
how to translate the rest of significant discourse, statement by state-
ment, into it. Carnap embarked on this project in the Aufbau.15
To account for the external world as a logical construct of sense 
data – such, in Russell’s terms, was the program. It was Carnap, 
in his Der logische Aufbau der Welt of 1928, who came nearest to 
executing it. […] Carnap’s constructions, if carried successfully to 
completion, would have enabled us to translate all sentences about 
the world into terms of sense data, or observation, plus logic and 
set theory.16 
To summarize the received view: Carnap’s Aufbau is such a work 
in philosophy which is a logical heir of classical (and Russell-type) 
empiricism where the fundamental base of our knowledge is the 
phenomenalist sense-data. The set of meaningful statements con-
sists only in statements about sense-data or a logical construction 
from those statements. 
12 Rudolf Carnap, “Intellectual Autobiography,” in The Philosophy of Rudolf 
Carnap, edited by Paul A. Schilpp, (Open Court, 1963), 13.
13 See Bertrand Russell, “The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics,” Scientia 1914 
(16):155.
14 In the United Kingdom this role was fulfilled by Ayer who presented and 
defended the sense data theory in his Language, Truth and Logic.
15 Quine, “Two Dogmas…,” 39.
16 Quine, “Epistemology Naturalized …,” 74.
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2. The rehabilitation of the Aufbau
My aim is twofold in this section. On the one hand, I will overview 
the main panels of the recent secondary literature on Carnap in 
order to shed some light on how people on both sides of the Atlantic 
Ocean consider the rehabilitation of Carnap. I shall deal with it in 
three steps following the three aspects of the received view. On the 
other hand, I will sketch such a partial interpretation of the Aufbau 
which was neglected so far.
2.1. The non-empiricists roots of the Aufbau
Though it is well motivated to view the Aufbau from the tradition 
of empiricism, in fact, it never served as the only and absolute base 
for Carnap as it was, for example, for Locke, Berkeley or Hume.17 
If empiricism is not the only source of the Aufbau then what are 
the other sources? Neo-Kantianism was in the last few decades the 
most discussed and investigated tradition in the context of Carnap. 
This reading of the Aufbau was defended mainly by Michael Fried-
man and Alan Richardson18 who claimed that the main notions, 
motivations, and solutions of the Aufbau are organically related to 
the German Neo-Kantian tendencies. In their view, the main ques-
tion of the work is a transcendental one: “How is intersubjective/
objective scientific knowledge possible at all?” One should read the 
17 In “Testability and Meaning” Carnap claimed that though empiricism is 
obviously present in his works it is only a hypotheses, a suggestion which should 
be judged by its success and pragmatic virtues and not by its truth (Rudolf 
Carnap, “Testability and Meaning – Continued,” The Philosophy of Science 4 (1): 
33). Hence one shall think of a methodological empiricism and not a substantive, 
true-or-false philosophical thesis. This seems to be confirmed also by the fact 
that in the Aufbau Carnap developed a neutral language for the then-current 
epistemological schools, see §§176-178.
18 See Alan W. Richardson, Carnap’s Construction of the World – The Aufbau 
and the Emergence of Logical Empiricism (Cambridge University Press, 1998); and 
Michael Friedman, Reconsidering Logical Positivism (Cambridge University Press, 
1999). Of course many other scholars have claimed for a (Neo-)Kantian reading 
of the Aufbau before the 1990s – for them see the references in the mentioned 
works.
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Aufbau as providing a detailed answer to this question19 (and I will 
come back to that later). 
The Neo-Kantian roots of Carnap’s intellectual development are 
documented quite well. He was educated at the universities of Jena 
and Freiburg between 1910 and 1914. In Jena, one of his teachers 
was the Neo-Kantian Bruno Bauch (who was also the editor of Kant 
Studien until 1916) who gave lectures on Kant’s first critique for 
two semesters. After the First World War Bauch became Carnap’s 
Doktorvater.20 In the dissertation (which was completed in 1921 
and published in Kant Studien in 1922) Carnap discussed the differ-
ent meanings and frames of the notion of space, one of which was 
“intuitive space” based on the ideas of Kant and partly of Husserl.21
19 The (Neo-)Kantian tendencies could be detected in many other places of the 
Aufbau. For example see Friedman’s claim: “[logical empiricists and Carnap’s] 
central philosophical innovation is not a new version of radical empiricism 
but rather a new conception of a priori knowledge and its role in empirical 
knowledge.” Friedman, Reconsidering…, xv.
20 Carnap had a lot of problems with his dissertation. First he wanted to submit a 
proposal (about axiomatic foundations of kinematics) to the physics department 
but it was too philosophical for them (as claimed by Max Wien), then he went to 
the philosophy department but it was too physical for them. At one point he asked 
also Hugo Dingler to be his supervisor (ASP RC 028-12-11) but after all Bruno 
Bauch has undertaken the task and oriented Carnap towards the philosophy of 
geometry. See Carnap, “Intellectual Autobiography,” 11.
21 About Carnap’s conception of space and geometry and his dissertation see 
Adolf Grünbaum, “Carnap’s View on the Foundations of Geometry,” in The 
Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, edited by Paul A. Schilpp (Open Court, 1963), 599-
684; and Thomas Mormann, “Geometrical leitmotifs in Carnap’s early philosophy,” 
in The Cambridge Companion to Carnap, edited by Michael Friedman, Richard 
Creath, (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 43–64. According to Mormann 
Carnap’s philosophy of geometry in the 1920s contained the leitmotifs of the later 
metaphilosophical commitments. Interestingly, after that Carnap presented his 
method of quasi-analyzes in the Aufbau which was applied also to geometrical 
objects, in his later works he did not touch upon the questions of the recent 
developments of geometry. A few exceptions could be found in his introductory 
book to philosophy of science (Rudolf Carnap, An Introduction to the Philosophy 
of Science, edited by Martin Gardner (New York: Dover Publications, In, 
1966/1995)), in his reply to Grünbaum (Rudolf Carnap, “Adolf Grünbaum on 
the Philosophy of Space and Time,” in The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, edited by 
Paul A. Schilpp, (Open Court, 1963), 952–958) and a few lectures in the Vienna 
Circle in the early 1930s (see ASP RC 110-09-04 and a lecture presented at the 
Dessau Bauhaus, ASP RC 110-07-48).
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Though it is really hard to neglect the tradition of Neo-Kantian-
ism in the case of a scholar who had been socialized and educated 
in the institutional frameworks of the early twentieth century Ger-
many, the defenders of the influence of German philosophy on Car-
nap’s work claim that the motivation and aims of the Aufbau cannot 
be understood without referring to Neo-Kantianism (so the influ-
ence is not just a contingent fact but a substantial one):
Carnap’s problem [in the Aufbau] is how to account for the objec-
tivity of knowledge despite its subjective origins. The problem itself 
and the role of formal notions in its solution, combined with indubi-
table facts about the sort of philosophical education Carnap received 
in the 1910s in Jena, reorient the story toward a rather different 
philosophical tradition from Russell’s – the tradition of scientific 
neo-Kantianism that was in full flower in the Marburg and South-
west schools in the first quarter of the twentieth century.22
We cannot move on without mentioning another tradition that had 
a huge influence on Carnap’s general thought and world-view.23 
André Carus devoted a whole book to the interpretation which 
claims that Carnap’s philosophy and 
[t]he conceptual framework he created is still the most promising 
instrument […] for the very purpose he invented it to serve, in the 
somewhat utopian Vienna Circle context of the 1920s and early 
1930s: it is still the best basis for a comprehensive and internally 
consistent Enlightenment world view.24
Carus argues that the works of Carnap (and some other members 
of the Vienna Circle) could be interpreted as the most successful 
attempts to revive the spirit of Enlightenment in the twentieth cen-
tury.25 Though Carus’ main aim is to show that through the late 
Carnap’s notion and method of explication provide the base to 
understand the idea of Enlightenment and conceptual engineering 
22 Richardson, Carnap’s Construction…, 2. Italics added.
23 The further non-empiricists roots of the Aufbau will be discussed in sections 
2.2-3-4.
24 André Carus, Carnap and Twentieth-Century Thought: Explication as 
Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 8. Italics added.
25 On the influence of Enlightenment on Carnap see also Jacques Bouveresse, 
“Rudolf Carnap and the Legacy of Aufklärung,” in Carnap’s Ideal of Explication 
and Naturalism, edited by Richard Wagner, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 47–62.
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of Carnap, some traits, and leitmotifs of them could be revealed also 
in the social and cultural connotations of the Aufbau as well as in its 
worldview [Weltanschauung] (I will discuss these points later on).
2.2. The non-foundationalist reading of the Aufbau
Many passages of the Aufbau seem to imply that one cannot interpret 
it as a work in the tradition of foundationalism. Though – as I men-
tioned earlier – Carnap designates Russell as his principal source in 
the Aufbau, in fact, he distanced himself from Russell’s more meta-
physical foundationalist project (§176). If we take the foundational 
project as a substantive ontological claim which states that there is 
a basic, fundamental level of entities (sense data, according to Rus-
sell) to which we can reduce all the other complex entities (hence 
the elements of the external world would be logical constructions of 
these basic entities), then this thesis is not contained in the Aufbau.
Carnap treated these kinds of metaphysical claims as being out-
side of science and scientific philosophy, hence the question – how 
is the world built up from an ontological point of view – is not a 
concern of the Aufbau-project.26 Though Carnap dealt with our 
knowledge about the external world and reality (§§170–178) he 
distinguished the empirical and the metaphysical notions of reality 
(§§175–178). While the former involves scientific questions – which 
shall be answered by empirical means – and hence its conceptual 
26 The Aufbau does not contain the usual verificationist arguments against 
metaphysics as they were present in the “Überwindung” article. Carnap started 
to use them only in his Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie; the reason is that while 
the most parts of the Aufbau was already written before Carnap went to Vienna, 
he worked out the Scheinprobleme during his stay in Vienna and thus it shows the 
influence of the Circle (the Aufbau was after all his Habilitationsschrift which he 
submitted to University of Vienna in 1925). That time Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 
was still on the table and the members of the Circle interpreted it as presenting 
a verificationist argument against metaphysics (see Carnap, “Intellectual 
Autobiography,” 24. ff.). The Circle started to read the Tractatus (after that Kurt 
Reidemeister introduced it in 1924) in November 1925 (ASP RC 029-32-34) and 
continued reading it in the next semester (ASP RC 029-32-27). About the specific 
arguments of the Aufbau see Michael Friedman, “The Aufbau and the rejection 
of metaphysics,” in The Cambridge Companion to Carnap, edited by Michael 
Friedman, Richard Creath (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 129–152.
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framework could be integrated into the language of the Aufbau, the 
questions about the metaphysical reality stem from the fact, in a 
Kantian fashion, that particular philosophical schools “transgress 
their proper boundaries” (§178).
The foundationalist approach, however, has an epistemological 
reading too. From this angle, it claims that we depict one of our 
cognitive faculties and states its priority over the others. One could 
claim (quite schematically) that empiricism emphasized the role of 
sensation while rationalism emphasized the role of our intellectual 
capacities.27
The structure of the Aufbau’s system differs from both founda-
tionalist projects. Instead of one final base on which one can con-
struct our knowledge, Carnap developed a constitution system [Kon-
stitutionssystem] of knowledge. A constitutional system is just “an 
epistemic-logical system of objects or concepts” (§1), that is “a step-
by-step ordering of objects in such a way that the objects of each 
level are constituted from those of the lower levels” (§2). Though 
Carnap is talking about the constitution of objects, he makes it clear 
at the beginnings that he takes “object” [Gegenstand] in a wide 
sense, so “among objects [Gegenständen] we count not only things 
[Dinge], but also properties and classes, relations in extension and 
intension, states and event, what is actual as well as what is not” (§1). 
Similarly, a few paragraphs later Carnap says that he won’t make any 
difference between objects and concepts [Begriffe], since
[a]ctually, we have here not two conceptions, but only two different 
interpretative modes of speech. Thus, in a constitution theory we 
sometimes speak of constituted objects, sometimes of constituted 
concepts, without differentiating. These two parallel languages 
which deal with concepts and with objects and still say the same 
thing are actually the languages of realism and idealism. […] Con-
stitution theory employs a neutral language and maintains that 
objects are neither “created” nor “apprehended” but constituted. I 
wish to emphasize from the beginning that the phrase “to consti-
tute” is always meant in a completely neutral sense. From the point 
of view of constitution theory, the controversy between “creation” 
27 In the preface to the second edition of the Aufbau Carnap emphasized the 
very same mistake of pure empiricism and pure rationalism. See Aufbau, vi.
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[Erzeugen] and “apprehension” [Erkennen] is an idle linguistic dis-
pute.28
One can see from these passages that Carnap is not concerned with 
ontological questions; when he is dealing with the constitution of 
objects he is not engaged in the logical construction of objects – as 
Russell – but in the constitution of our conceptual knowledge.
One should note here the following. The Anglo-Saxon recep-
tion of the Aufbau was highly determined by the English transla-
tion of Rolf A. George.29 First of all the title of the English edition, 
The Logical Structure of the World is somehow misleading and 
obscures the cultural and social involvement of the German term 
“Aufbau”. As Peter Galison pointed out, “Aufbau” means not just 
structure, reconstruction or rebuilding, but refers to the process of 
“sweep[ing] out the old order and to build anew”.30 All of those who 
belonged to the different “Aufbau-projects” tried to break with past 
traditions in order to achieve an unprecedented building and were 
deeply convinced that the “Aufbau” could not be superficial.31 “It 
had to embody not just the trappings of political change — it had 
to transform culture, education, architecture, and the modes of rea-
soning that guide us through the world” because “[w]orld structure 
and inner life were bound together: modifying even the vocabulary 
of expression became a way of modifying thinking.”32
“Aufbau” meant, therefore, the overall and comprehensive reform 
and transformation of culture and social order; it had to include 
also the modernization and rationalization of our theoretical and 
28 Aufbau, §5.
29 Of course, many of the articles which document the received view were 
published before the English edition of the Aufbau, so one shall not blame solely 
the translation of George. 
30 Peter Galison, “Constructing Modernism: The Cultural Location of Aufbau,” 
in Origins of Logical Empiricism, edited by Ronald N Giere, Alan W. Richardson 
(University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 18.
31 Dilthey, for example, had his own “Aufbau”, Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen 
Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften. Later in 1932, Alfred Schütz, the Austrian 
social scientist, inspired by phenomenology, also wrote an “Aufbau”, Der sinnhafte 
Aufbau der sozialen Welt: eine Einleitung in die verstehende Soziologie, which 
could be read as a reaction to Carnap’s allegedly pure logical “Aufbau” showing 
the meaningful structure (sinnhafte Aufbau) of the world.
32 Galison, “Constructing Modernism…”, 18 and 31.
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practical knowledge and conceptualization usually after a huge fail-
ure, destruction, trauma or drama. From a social and political point 
of view, these traumas were the First and Second World Wars along 
with the status of technology in the wars and in the life of society. 
From the side of philosophy, it was connected to the revolutions in 
physics around the turn of the twentieth century. The philosophical 
“Aufbau” relies on the phenomenon that philosophy couldn’t keep 
abreast of its time and the scientific achievements within it.33
We have to note, however, that the title of the book, “Aufbau”, 
was suggested by Schlick – Carnap’s earlier preferred titles were, 
for example, “Vom Chaos zur Wirklichkeit”, “Prolegomena zu einer 
Konstitutionstheorie der Wirklichkeit.”34 This could mean that it 
shows the preferences of Schlick and not that of Carnap, but the 
content of the Aufbau and Carnap’s intellectual development makes 
it clear that the title suggested by Schlick was just apt for Carnap’s 
purposes.
George translated the core concepts of the Aufbau (“konstitu-
ieren” and “Konstitutionssystem”) as “construction” and “construc-
tional system” and so strengthened the received view of the book.35 
While Russell dealt with the logical construction of objects of the 
external world, Carnap used the German “Konstruktion” quite 
rarely, and especially not in the context of describing his own aims 
33 Galison connects the translation of “Aufbau” to “structure” in the title with 
the cultural and social influences of the 1960s in the United States, cf. Galison, 
“Constructing Modernism…”, 40 ff.
34 Cf. Alberto Coffa, The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap: To the 
Vienna Station (Cambridge University Press, 1991), 403, n. 11. In the unedited 
autobiography Carnap also mentions Schlick in the context of choosing the final 
title. See Carnap 1957, UCLA, Box 2, CM3, MA-3, p. E28. I would like to thank 
Christian Damböck for pointing this out. See also the correspondence between 
Schlick and Carnap about the title, ASP RC 029-32-23; ASP RC 029-32-21; ASP 
RC 029-32-17; ASP RC 029-30-36.
35 For the origins and details of the term “konstituieren” see Robert Sokolowski, 
The Formation of Husserl’s Concept of Constitution (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1970). 
In the case of Husserl, Sokolowski connects the notion to the Neo-Kantian Paul 
Natorp, who also had an important influence on the young Carnap (see Carnap, 
“Intellectual Autobiography,” 12; and 1957, UCLA, Box 2, CM3, MA-3.) and who 
is referred to in the Aufbau quite frequently (§§5, 64, 65, 162, 163, 179.) It is also 
known from the personal reading list of Carnap that he read the works of Natorp 
several times between 1920 and 1922. See ASP RC 025-03-05.
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and works. The translation of George is dangerous because it moves 
Carnap’s metaphysically neutral and Russell’s metaphysically com-
mitted projects too close to each other and thus obscures the con-
text of the Aufbau – those cultural, social, political and philosophi-
cal traditions in which it was born.
The notions of “constitution”, “constitution system” and “consti-
tution theory” suggest that Carnap is strongly connected both to 
Neo-Kantianism and to the philosophy of Edmund Husserl. It is 
known that when Carnap was living in Buchenbach near to Freiburg 
between 1919 and 1925 (just before he went to Vienna), he attended 
the seminars of Husserl and even some Husserlian circles after the 
seminars in the academic year 1924/25.36 But Carnap was dealing 
with many works of Husserl even at the time when he was working 
on his dissertation between 1919 and 1921.37 Though there are dif-
ferent views about Husserl’s role in the Aufbau,38 it is evidently true 
36 Karl Schuhmann, Husserl-Chronik (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1977), 281.; and Karl 
Schuhmann, Edmund Husserl: Briefwechsel, Band IV (Boston: Kluwer, 1994), 298. 
Carnap’s diary also proves this. In that we can follow step-by-step that he asked 
permission from Husserl to join his seminar (ASP RC 025-72-02, Nov. 13.), that 
Husserl allowed it (Nov. 17.), that Carnap read Ideen in order to prepare for the 
seminar (Nov. 1923), that he gave a talk at the seminar (ASP RC 025-72-03, Jan. 
23.), and that he attended the discussions after Husserl’s seminars in January 1924 
(among the participants were Ludwig Landgrebe and Bernhard Merten).
37 Rosado Haddock (2008, ix-x) argued that Kant was integrated into Carnap’s 
dissertation only due to the influence of Bauch and Husserl’s influence was much 
more important. Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock, The Young Carnap’s Unknown 
Master (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2008), ix–x. André Carus 
showed quite convincingly, however, that the first versions of the dissertation 
did not contain any reference to Husserl so the citation of Kant could be not 
just a “cosmetic-move”. André Carus, Carnap and Twentieth-Century Thought: 
Explication as Enlightenment (Cambridge University Press, 2007: 109–115, 
127–138); and André Carus, “Carnap and Phenomenology: What Happened 
in 1924?,” in Influences on the Aufbau, edited by Christian Damböck (Springer, 
2016:137-162).
38 According to Sarkar and Rosado Haddock Husserl provided the main 
influence on the early Carnap’s thought. Others (like Carus and Roy) are skeptical 
about Husserl’s role. See further V. E. Mayer Mayer, “Die Konstruktion der 
Erfahrungswelt: Carnap und Husserl,” in Erkenntnis Orientated: A Centennial 
Volume for Rudolf Carnap and Hans Reichenbach, edited by Wolfgang Spohn, 
Springer, 1991), 287–303; and Thomas Ryckman, “Carnap and Husserl,” in The 
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that when Carnap refers to Husserl in the Aufbau (§§3, 64, 65, 124, 
164) he does it in a quite positive manner.
To account for one possible effect of Husserl on the Aufbau one 
has to take a look at its constitution system which is a multilayered 
theory of knowledge (MTK). MTK is characterized by Deodáth Zuh as
[…] a theory on the structure and functioning of human cogni-
tion set up as a layered architecture of simple and complex factual 
capacities and faculties of knowledge. […] They are separate fac-
ulties fulfilling separate cognitive roles, which must communi-
cate and cooperate with each other to implement a coherent way 
of perceiving and understanding the world. It should be admitted, 
that such communicating layers could be unequal in their concrete 
working (in everyday or enclosed scientific cases), or that a specific 
faculty could dominate the other(s), but their theoretical ease for 
cooperation is of utmost importance. This is why it is a theory on 
the possible grounds of knowledge, on how knowledge should be 
set together and not on a current state of representing something 
through a unique source of knowledge. It must be labeled as a tran-
scendental theory of cognition, where the one-sided priority of a 
specific faculty is considered to be strongly reductive and subse-
quently a philosophical error.39
The two cornerstones of MTK are that (1) our cognitive capacities 
are divided into simple and complex ones where the latter are built 
on the former ones and (2) these capacities are “communicating” 
with each other or work together in order not to exceed their own 
boundaries and to produce knowledge.
Besides Husserl,40 the most important figure is Kant who claimed 
in accordance with (1) and (2) that “[t]houghts without content are 
empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.”41  Kant tried to show 
Cambridge Companion to Carnap, edited by Michael Friedman and Richard 
Creath (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 81–105.
39 Deodáth Zuh, “Arnold Hauser and the multilayer theory of knowledge,” 
Studies in East European Thought. Forthcoming. 45–46.
40 Most of Husserl remarks about the MTK are scattered in his writings but 
important points could be found in his 1930/1960, especially 67-69; 1936/1970, 
§§2-4 and 1929/1969. Some important ideas of MTK are also to be found in his 
1891/2003.
41 Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason (Cambridge University Press, 
1787/2000), 193–194. See also Immanuel Kant, “On the Form and Principles of the 
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that the erroneous moment in empiricism and rationalism was that 
both of them highlighted one of our cognitive capacities and tried 
to force it to produce the substantial knowledge elements. Kant’s 
transcendental philosophy, however, was one of the first steps to 
show that knowledge can be achieved only through the joint work 
of all our cognitive faculties.
While Kant and Husserl aimed to reveal our epistemic capaci-
ties, the cognitive structures of the mind and how they yield various 
kinds of knowledge, Carnap was interested only in our conceptual 
knowledge (see §§180-182), in the logical relations between (empir-
ical) concepts and sentences made out of them.42
Carnap’s MTK works with at least four different layers,43 or levels 
of objects: at the first level are the autopsychological objects (§§106-
122): “the acts of consciousness: perceptions, representations [Vor-
stellungen], feelings, thoughts, acts of will, and so on. (§18)” On the 
second layer are the physical objects: “these are characterized by the 
fact that, at a given time, they occupy a given space (i.e., an extended 
piece of space). Thus, place, shape, size, and position belong to the 
determining characteristics of any physical body. (§18)” The third 
level consists of the so-called heteropsychological objects which are 
the same as the autopsychological ones but belong to another indi-
vidual. The fourth layer is for geistige Gegenstände (I shall deal with 
them later).
These layers are built on each other, and though each base has 
its own laws, properties and structure, they are reducible: geistige 
Gegenstände can be reduced to heteropsychological (and physical) 
ones, which in turn can be reduced to physical ones and they could 
Sensible and Intelligible World,” In Theoretical Philosophy 1755–1770, Cambridge 
University Press (1770/1992), 373–410; and Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from 
a Pragmatic Point of View (Cambridge University Press, 1800/2006).
42 Carnap mentions Husserl also in the historical context of the constitution 
theory (§3) and despite the many similarities, Jean-Michel Roy lists important 
differences. Jean-Michel Roy, “Carnap’s Husserlian Reading of the Aufbau,” in 
Carnap Brought Home – The View from Jena, edited by Stewe Awodey and Carsten 
Klein (La Salle: Open Court, 2004), 41–62.
43 In §25 Carnap is introducing more layers and object types than the ones 
discussed here. He talks about logical objects, mathematical objects, the object 
types of spatial configurations, colors, pitches, odors, tastes, biological objects, 
ethical objects, values etc.
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be reduced to the autopsychological objects.44 This reduction is, 
however, not an ontological, but a logical one as I mentioned earlier: 
it deals with sentences about these objects and their logical relation-
ships.45 Thus, the Aufbau is not concerned with the more and more 
complex cognitive capacities but with the logical reduction and 
constitution of sentences which codifies our knowledge about the 
various objects. Constitution theory is just about the idea that the 
(empirical) statements describe different spheres of objects (§29) 
which “are brought into a stratified order within the constitutional 
system by constituting some of these objects on the basis of others” 
(§41). So Carnap’s constitution theory – by contrast to Husserl’s who 
was interested in the pre-predicative level also – is applied mainly to 
the predicative level, to the linguistically articulated concepts.
The first level of the Aufbau is the domain of the autopsycho-
logical objects (§§63–64). Carnap tried to derive the statements 
about the higher-level objects from the statements about the lower 
level objects. At this point one is faced with an important difference 
between Carnap and the usual reductive empiricist works which 
search for the fundamental level of our knowledge. Carnap states 
that such a constitutional system whose basic level contains not 
autopsychological but physical objects is also possible and legitimate 
(§§59, 62). It is a practical decision, according to him, which one we 
choose and our decision depends on our aims: if we want to follow 
the epistemic order of knowledge, then we shall choose the autopsy-
chological level, but if we focus on the needs of the empirical sci-
ences, then “the constitution system with physical basis constitutes 
a more appropriate arrangement of concepts than any other” (§59).
This tolerance was always in the foreground of Carnap’s intel-
lectual development, i.e. Carnap committed himself not to certain 
philosophical positions but to a methodology and attitude; this atti-
44 Interestingly the domain of values [Werte], for example, seems to be reducible 
directly to the autopsychological layer. Cf. Aufbau, §152.
45 See Thomas Uebel, “Carnap’s Aufbau and Physicalism: What Does the ‘Mutual 
Reducibility’ of Psychological and Physical Objects Amount to?” in European 
Philosophy of Science – Philosophy of Science in Europe and the Viennese Heritage, 
Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook, Vol. 17., edited by Maria C. Galavotti, Elisabeth 
Nemeth and Friedrich Stadler, Springer, 2014), 45–56.
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tude was formulated later explicitly in his principle of tolerance.46 As 
Michael Friedman said,
Carnap nowhere employs the traditional epistemological vocabu-
lary of “certainty,” “justification,” “doubt,” and so on in the Aufbau. 
He nowhere says that knowledge of autopsychological objects is 
more certain or more secure than knowledge of physical objects, 
and the distinction between “hard data” and “soft data” central to 
Russell’s motivation for his construction of the external world is 
entirely foreign to the Aufbau.47
Recall our earlier transcendental question: “How is intersubjective 
scientific knowledge possible at all?” – Carnap gives not a typical 
foundationalist answer, but a structuralist one:
[…] even though the material of the individual streams of experi-
ence is completely different […] certain structural properties are 
analogous for all streams of experience. Now, if science is to be 
objective, then it must restrict itself to statements about such struc-
tural properties […].48
One should conclude therefore that the Aufbau is not a foundation-
alist work in the camp of reductive empiricism and most of its pas-
sages could be interpreted more properly in the context and tradi-
tion of the Kantian-Husserlian constitution theory.
2.3. The Aufbau and the readings of phenomenalism
Most critiques of the Aufbau objected to Carnap that his book is a 
reductionist, phenomenalist work and as such – based on the argu-
ments against the sense data theory – was doomed to failure. Since 
Carnap chose the autopsychological level as his base (and started 
from the private sensations of individuals) it could be hard to deny 
that a certain phenomenalist view dominated the Aufbau. From this 
angle some of the criticisms against the book seem to be justified; 
nonetheless, we shall consider one important aspect of Carnap’s 
work.
46 See Rudolf Carnap, Logische Syntax der Sprache (Wien: Springer, 1934), §17.
47 Friedman, Reconsidering…, 119.
48 Aufbau, §66.
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The approach to be found in the Aufbau was not a typical and clas-
sical phenomenalist sense data theory. Such theories (like Hume’s, 
Mach’s, Russell’s and Ayer’s) take as given the primitive and atomic 
sensations (like colors, forms, sounds) and reduce the complex ones 
to these. In Carnap’s constitution system, however, the typical sense 
data occurs only at a late and complex level.49 Carnap’s starting 
points were the “elementary experiences” [Elementarerlebnisse],50 a 
special totality of experiences instead of isolated and atomic ones 
(§67): “Modern psychological research has confirmed more and 
more that, in the various sense modalities, the total impression is 
epistemically primary, and that the so-called individual sensations 
are derived only through abstractions […].” So on the base of the 
results of Gestalt-psychology,51 Carnap defended a holistic picture of 
knowledge and experience and rejected the “atomist” approaches.52
49 Cf. Friedman, Reconsidering…, 91.
50 Carnap claims that knowledge is constituted on the base of a single relation 
between the Elementarerlebnisse called “the recollection of similarities” 
[Ähnlichkeitserinnerung]. The idea of the recollection of the similarities and 
the role of memory in knowledge-forming was a quite common approach that 
time. One source of Carnap might have been the Nobel-prize winner chemist 
Wilhelm Ostwald. Ostwald claimed in his Grundriß der Naturphilosophie from 
1908 [Outline of Natural Philosophy] that “[f]or the human mind […] the 
world appears first as a chaos which consists in discrete experiences. The only 
connection between them is limited to the fact that they are sequenced. From 
these experiences [Erlebnisse] […] some of them emerges as recurring more 
often and thus gets a distinctive character: it become familiar. It stems from the 
fact that we remember [sich erinnern] the earlier similar experiences, i.e. we feel a 
certain connection between the present and certain earlier experiences.” (Wilhelm 
Ostwald, Grundriss der Naturphilosophie (Leipzig: Philipp Reclam.1908), 19. My 
translation.) It is known that Carnap read Ostwald already before his student 
years (ASP RC 025-98-01 and ASP RC 025-97-01) and before the preparation of 
the Aufbau (ASP RC 025-03-05). On the relation between Carnap and Ostwald 
see Hans-Joachim Dahms, “Carnap’s Early Conception of a ’System of all 
Concepts’: The Importance of Wilhelm Ostwald,” in Influences on the Aufbau, 
edited by Christian Damböck (Springer, 2016), 163-185.
51 On the influence of Gestalt-psychology see Carnap, “Intellectual 
Autobiography,” 16.
52 See Aufbau, §§76, 36, 71. Some of the main representatives and defenders of 
Gestalt-psychology (like Wolfgang Köhler and Kurt Lewin) was a close associate 
of Carnap as a member of the Berlin Group led by Hans Reichenbach.
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Based on this, Friedman’s question – namely that if Carnap were 
to justify the classical foundationalist-phenomenalist empiricism, 
then why would he spend so much time and energy on constituting 
one’s individual sensations – seems to be rather rhetorical.53
2.4. The Aufbau and the “geistige Gegenstände”
The Aufbau contains passages which could be seen at first as perplex-
ing since they do not fit into the problem-horizon of early analytic 
philosophy. One of the most outstanding examples is when Carnap 
considers geistige Gegenstände and the theory of values (§§23–24, 
§§150–152). Nonetheless, Carnap (§23) is definitely stating that “[f]
or philosophy, the most important types of objects, outside of the 
physical and the psychological ones are the ‘geistige Gegenstände’ in 
the sense of ‘cultural’, ‘historical’, ‘sociological’ objects.”  Among the 
geistige Gegenstände one finds “individual incidents and large scale 
occurrences, sociological groups, institutions, movements in all 
areas of culture, and also properties and relations of such processes 
and entities” (§23) and some later points Carnap considers various 
customs and habits (§§24, 150), the object state [Staat] (§151), tech-
nology, economics, law, politics, language, science, religion (§151).
Geistige Gegenstände form one of the highest levels of the consti-
tution system though our knowledge of them depends on the lower 
levels – we know the geistige Gegenstände through their physical 
manifestations and documentations (§24): Carnap calls “documen-
tations of a geistiger Gegenstand those permanent physical objects 
in which the mental life [das geistige Leben] is, as it were, solidified: 
products, artifacts, and documents of the mental [des Geistigen].”
One could differentiate the usual cliché about Carnap by noting 
that beyond the geistige Gegenstände he accounts for values as 
forming an independent level in the constitution system and thus 
considers also the theory of values (§152): “For aesthetic values, we 
take into account experiences of (aesthetic) pleasure or other atti-
tudes in the appreciation of art, experiences of artistic creation, etc. 
The particular nature of the value experiences of the different value 
types is investigated by the phenomenology of values […].” In order 
53 See Friedman, Reconsidering…, 92.
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to understand aesthetic values and experiences Carnap’s examples 
are ethical ones which are connected to the feeling of obligation and 
responsibility. To account for the individual character and structure 
of the value-experiences – on the base of value sensations [Wertge-
fühl] – one has to turn to phenomenological investigations (§152).
After the phenomenological investigations are done, the results 
could be integrated into the system of the Aufbau. Carnap, in fact, 
did not spend more time on these questions since, in the Aufbau, he 
only sketches his system and theory and as we move along between 
the different levels his expositions get thinner. Its reason is to be 
found not solely in the lack of space: Carnap’s motivation is phil-
osophical. Both in the preface of the Aufbau and in his intellectual 
autobiography he claimed that the formation of a comprehensive 
scientific system is a task of the scientific community where every-
one has her own task and field of research and he carried out only 
his part.54
We cannot here give an explicit account of [the constitution of geis-
tige Gegenstände]. The reason for this is that the psychology (or 
phenomenology) of the cognition of cultural items [die Psychol-
ogie (oder Phänomenologie) der Kulturerkenntnis] has not been 
researched and systematically described to the same degree as the 
psychology of perception. Thus we give only a few examples and 
indicate briefly how they could be generalized. These indications 
may suffice, since we are here mainly concerned with the possibility 
of constitution of geistige Gegenstände from psychological objects 
and since we are less concerned with the question precisely what 
forms these constitutions must take.55
One could still raise the question: how did the geistige Gegen-
stände and the values end up in the Aufbau? What were the sources 
of Carnap when he tried to integrate them into his own system? 
With respect to the theory of values, one could emphasize the role 
of Heinrich Rickert the leading philosopher of the Baden-school 
of Neo-Kantianis, who tried to develop a systematic value theory. 
Rickert argued that values give the key to the understanding and 
knowing of the world and hence have a certain priority over the 
54 See Aufbau, xvi-xvii and Carnap, “Intellectual Autobiography,” 16.
55 Aufbau, §150.
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de-individualize method of the natural sciences.56 It is known that 
Rickert was one of the main teachers of Carnap in Freiburg before 
the First World War and so – next to Bauch and Natorp – in the 
Neo-Kantian tradition Rickert had the biggest effect on Carnap’s 
thought from this respect.
Regarding the notion of geistiger Gegenstand we are facing a 
complex situation. Carnap was influenced indirectly by Wilhelm 
Dilthey’s approach to the Geisteswissenschaften [human sciences] 
and particularly by his empirical account. Though according to 
Carnap, he never dealt with the works of Dilthey at firsthand,57 
some of Dilthey’s students were the teachers of Carnap and hence 
forwarded Dilthey’s ideas to him. One such teacher at the University 
of Jena was Herman Nohl and Carnap remembered him with “great 
enthusiasm” in his intellectual autobiography.58 Christian Dam-
böck connects the idea to Dilthey that we have to access the geistige 
Gegenstände from a posteriori experiential base (by contrast to the 
a priori approaches of Kant and Hegel).59 As Dilthey formulated it: 
“All science is experiential; but all experiences must be related back 
to and derives its validity from the conditions and context of con-
sciousness in which it arises, i.e., the totality of our nature.”60
56 After all only the first volume of Rickert’s purported system was published, 
see Heinrich Rickert, System der Philosophie (Tübingen, 1921). About the 
comparison of Rickert and Carnap see Thomas Mormann, “Werte bei Carnap.” 
Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 62 (2): 169–189. Carus argues against the 
overemphasizing of the similarities between Rickert and Carnap. Carus, Carnap 
and Twentieth-Century Thought…, 106–108.
57 See Carnap’s letter to Wilhelm Flitner (ASP RC 102-28-07) from the 11th of 
December, 1968. 
58 See Carnap, “Intellectual Autobiography,” 4. Cf. with the unpublished version 
of the autobiography, 1957, UCLA, Box 2, CM3, MA-3, pp. B3-4.
59 In his article Damböck gives a detailed exposition of Dilthey’s special 
empiricism and its effect on Carnap. Christian Damböck, “Rudolf Carnap and 
Wilhelm Dilthey: ‘German’ Empiricism in the Aufbau,” in Rudolf Carnap and 
the Legacy of Logical Empiricism, edited by Richard Creath, Dordrecht: Springer, 
2012), 67–88. Gabriel also contains many relevant discussions about Carnap’s 
time in Jena, his connection to romanticism and the ideas of Dilthey. Gottfried 
Gabriel, “Introduction: Carnap Brought Home,” in Carnap Brought Home – The 
View from Jena, edited by Steve Awodey, Carsten Klein (Open Court, 2004), 3–23.
60 Wilhelm Dilthey, Introduction to the Human Sciences. Selected Works, Volume 
1, Edited by Rudolf A. Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi (Princeton University Press, 
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Carnap showed in the first detailed part of the Aufbau how we 
can constitute the physical objects from our personal stream of total 
experiences. As long as the geistige Gegenstände could be consti-
tuted and grasped through the mediation of physical objects,61 the 
Geisteswissenschaften would be in a position to account for the var-
ious irrational (or better: arational and atheoretical) configurations 
of experiences, i.e. for the different worldviews [Weltanschauungen] 
which are documented through their objectual-physical objectivation. 
The geistige Gegenstände appears to us in two similar ways: (i) on 
the one hand they are manifested temporarily in (broadly taken) 
physical objects (for example, the lifting of a hat manifests the ges-
ture of greetings), and on the other hand (ii) they are documented 
permanently by material objects (for example the main building 
of the Dessau Bauhaus documents some trends and styles of the 
artistic movement). Both the lifting of the hat and the building of 
the Bauhaus are physical objects, thus, we know the geistige Gegen-
stände “behind them” through the mediation of physical objects, i.e. 
in a posterior way.
This special empiricist approach shows in itself the role of Dil-
they62 but we can be more specific. Dilthey took the range of the 
Geisteswissenschaften quite broadly: the object of the Geisteswis-
senschaften is the “socio-historical reality.”63 Among the Geisteswis-
1883/1989), 50.
61 At this point – contrary to the received view – one should not search for 
the origins of the radical and contemporary physicalism. Neurath, for example, 
made a distinction between physicalism [Physikalismus] and the physicalist 
[physikalistisch] approach. The former is a narrow physical approach (based 
on current mechanical and electro dynamical descriptions) while the latter 
operates only with spatiotemporal descriptions. See Otto Neurath, “Sociology 
in the framework of physicalism,” in Otto Neurath: Philosophical Papers 1913–
1946, edited by Robert S. Cohen and Marie Neurath (D. Reidel Publishing, 
1931/1983), 58–90. Neurath 1931/1983, 61. In this sense the codifications of the 
geistige Gegenstände (language, buildings, paintings etc.) could be grasped in a 
physicalist language.
62 Damböck considers the case of a special “German empiricism” and shows 
convincingly a line on which both Dilthey and Carnap could be placed. Christian 
Damböck, Das empirische Erbe des deutschen Idealismus. Mit Einzelstudien zu 
Wilhelm Dilthey, Hermann Cohen und Rudolf Carnap (Dordrecht: Springer, 
forthcoming).
63 Dilthey, Introduction…, 56.
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senschaften, one finds anthropology, political economy, history, 
philology, aesthetic, philosophy etc. What is more important for 
us now is that according to Dilthey, even a certain version of psy-
chology is to be accounted for in the Geisteswissenschaften: “The 
simplest results which an analysis of socio-historical reality is able 
to attain are found in psychology. For that reason, psychology is the 
first and most fundamental of the particular human sciences. Accord-
ingly, its truths constitute the basis of the further formation of the 
human sciences.”64
By contrast, Rickert claimed that the non-natural-sciences are 
to be contrasted not with the Geisteswissenschaften but with the 
Kulturwissenschaften [cultural sciences]:
Those who do empirical research have started to realize that – con-
trary to the philosophers’ mainstream belief – the term ‘Geisteswis-
senschaften’ is insufficient to characterize each and every types of 
non-natural-scientific sciences. And I am of the opinion, indeed, 
that those attempts of categorization which are based on the oppo-
sition between nature and mind [Geist] […] are not able to under-
stand the real existing differences between the empirical sciences, 
which would be crucial in this respect. […]65
For Rickert, however, the debate is not just about terminology. 
Among the Kulturwissenschaften psychology does not play a signif-
icant role like in the Geisteswissenschaften: the notion of Kulturwis-
senschaft “includes every objects of religious studies, jurisprudence, 
history, philology, national economics etc., so the objects of all kind 
of ‘Geisteswissenschaften’ except psychology [...]”.66 Rickert argues 
as follows: though the human Geist and psychic [seelische] pro-
cesses indeed have an important role in demarcating the non-natu-
64 Dilthey, Introduction…, 84. Italics added.
65 Heinrich Rickert, Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft (Tübingen: 
Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr, 1899/1926), 12. My translation.
66 Rickert, Kulturwissenschaft…, 22. My translation. About the notions of 
Kulturwissenschaft and Geisteswissenschaft see Rudolf A. Makkreel, “Wilhelm 
Dilthey and the Neo-Kantians. On the Conceptual Distinction between 
Geisteswissenschaften and  Kulturwissenschaften,” in Neo-Kantianism in 
Contemporary Philosophy, edited by Rudolf A. Maakreel and Sebastian Luft 
(Bloomington: Indiana University, 2010), 253–271.
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ral-sciences, “psychic life as such is also grasped as nature”.67 As such 
it could not serve as a proper signpost to draw a line between the 
non-natural-sciences and the natural sciences; according to Rickert, 
we have to mobilize the notion of culture [Kultur] for this task. But 
“one cannot use [the notion of Geist] to define the notion of cul-
ture”68 because of the former reasons and thus Rickert connects it to 
the idea of values [Werte].69 Culture goes hand in hand with values. 
Agriculture in itself, for instance, does not seem to be relevant for 
the Geisteswissenschaften; but various and significant cultural and 
other values stick to it and hence agriculture is a proper field of 
investigation for the Kulturwissenschaften. Therefore, we have to 
prefer the Kulturwissenschaften over the Geisteswissenschaften.
If one takes only the English translation of the Aufbau then she 
finds that Carnap considers only cultural objects and cultural sci-
ences. If we supplement this remark with the fact the Carnap was 
a student of Rickert in Freiburg, then one is inclined to see here 
another proof of the Neo-Kantian influence on Carnap. Never-
theless, it is not the case. Carnap deals with the so-called cultural 
objects [kulturelle Gegenstände] just occasionally (§§23, 150) and 
solely in a broader context. Likewise, he is not dealing with the 
Kulturwissenschaften. The objects of the system of the Aufbau are 
the geistige Gegenstände and the Geisteswissenschaften. Consider-
ing the influence of the students of Dilthey70 one should draw the 
conclusion that despite the suggestion of the English translation of 
the Aufbau, in the debate between the Kulturwissenschaften and 
67 Rickert, Kulturwissenschaft…, 26. My translation.
68 Rickert, Kulturwissenschaft…, 26. My translation.
69 Rickert suggests the following definition: “The way we use the term ‘culture’ 
is close to its common use, i.e. we understand by it all real objects to which 
generally accepted values, or sense constructions constituted of them, are 
adhered; and which objects are maintained with regard to these values.” Rickert, 
Kulturwissenschaft…, 27–28. My translation.
70 Damböck considers a sort of a Dilthey-school with such names and themes 
as Herman Nohl (history of philosophy, pedagogy), Wilhlem Flitner (pedagogy), 
Franz Roh (aesthetic), Hans Freyer (sociology). Damböck, “Rudolf Carnap…,” 
67–68. About these authors see further Gabriel, “Introduction…,” and Hans-
Joachim Dahms, “Neue Sachlichkeit in the Architecture and Philosophy,” in 
Carnap Brought Home – The View from Jena, edited by Steve Awodey and Carsten 
Klein (Open Court Publishing, 2004), 357–375.
294 On the Origins of Carnap’s Aufbau 
Geisteswissenschaften Carnap took the side of Dilthey against Rick-
ert (and neo-Kantianism).71
But we have to mention another important mediator of Dil-
they, namely Hans Freyer. Hans Freyer (1887–1969) was a conser-
vative German sociologist. Though nowadays he doesn’t seem to 
be one of the most discussed and cited authors (especially in the 
English-speaking world) and actually he is just forgotten, “he was 
perhaps the most articulate and historically self-conscious thinker 
associated with the movement for a ‘conservative revolution’ in the 
1920s […]. In the years after the First World War his status as a 
social theorist was acknowledged by intellectuals as diverse as Georg 
Simmel, Karl Mannheim, Herbert Marcuse, and Talcott Parsons.”72
Though there isn’t any correspondence between Carnap and 
Freyer in Carnap’s Nachlass and Carnap mentioned Freyer only a few 
times in his correspondence with others, it is known that they were 
good friends until around 1933 when Freyer joined the national-so-
cialist groups.73 In his Theorie des objektiven Geistes. Eine Einleitung 
in die Kulturphilosophie (Theory of Objective Mind – Introduction to 
the Philosophy of Culture, Freyer 1928/1998, first published in 1923) 
Freyer tried to work out his philosophy of culture [Kulturphiloso-
71 The hypotheses seems to be plausible also on the base that Carnap was aware 
of the mentioned debate since he read the above mentioned work of Rickert 
(Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft) and several others. See ASP RC 
025-03-05.
72 Jerry Z. Muller, The Other God that Failed – Hans Freyer and the Deradicalization 
of German Conservatism (Princeton University Press, 1987), 3. Muller’s book is 
one of the most detailed works on Freyer’s cultural, political and philosophical 
development in English. It also contains a comprehensive intellectual history of 
the early 20th century German-speaking world with a biography of Freyer. See 
also Elfriede Üner, Soziologie als „geistige Bewegung“. Hans Freyers System der 
Soziologie und die „Leipziger Schule“ (Weinheim: Acta Humaniora, VCH Verlag, 
1992) and Gerhard Schäfter, “Wider die Inszenierung des Vergessens,” Jahrbuch 
für Soziologiegeschichte 1990, 121-175. 
73 Both Freyer and Carnap participated before the First World War in the 
so-called Jugendbewegung [German Youth Movement]; in particular they were 
members of the group formed around Eugen Diederichs in Jena called Serakreis. 
See Carus, Carnap and Twentieth-Century Thought…; and Ádám Tamás Tuboly, 
“Carnap’s Weltanschauung and the Jugendbewegung: the story of an omitted 
chapter,” In Integrated History and Philosophy of Science, edited by Friedrich 
Stadler (Dordrecht: Springer), forthcoming.
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phie] on the base of the empirically given manifestations and docu-
mentations of the geistige Gegenstände and thus he wanted to give 
a solid foundation for the Geisteswissenschaften.74
In 1920, Carnap organized a scientific meeting in Buchenbach 
where besides him and Franz Roh the other participant was Frey-
er.75 Since I was dealing in a detailed manner with the comparison 
of Carnap’s Aufbau and Freyer’s Theorie at another place,76 I will just 
mention here a few things. Freyer was considering his work in a way 
as a counterpart of the Aufbau or at least with Carnap’s intention in 
the Aufbau when he was forming it on the early 1920s. The contem-
porary philosophy and logic that Freyer is mentioning in the fol-
lowing paragraph is just Carnap’s constitution system and his logic 
of relations:
The relation between the philosophy of culture and philosophy is 
actually one of a remarkable two-sidedness. Whoever thinks along 
the lines of the philosophy of culture must doubly arrange his work 
in the philosophical movement of the present. […] the philosophy 
of culture is today merely an anticipation, […]; it works with a logic 
that is still not developed […]. On the other hand, even for that 
reason, it may hope that its results will reach far beyond the bound-
aries of its own formulation of the problem, and that its work is 
of that kind of power from which the whole of philosophy can be 
advanced.77 
The Aufbau shows many more similar considerations and ideas 
that surfaced also in Theorie: like Carnap, Freyer was too working 
in a Kant-inspired transcendental framework when he asked the 
question: “what makes the experience of the Geisteswissenschaften 
possible in the first place?”78 Freyer’s answer was based on struc-
74 Carnap’s example about the lifting of the hat (§24) as a documentation of a 
geistiger Gegenstand came from Freyer. Hans Freyer, Theory of Objective Mind – 
Introduction to the Philosophy of Culture (Ohio University Press, 1928/1998), 55; 
66. Carnap is referring to Freyer in the Aufbau quite enthusiastically (§§12, 19, 56).
75 About the Buchenbach-meeting – which was motived by the ideas of Ostwald 
about the “system of the sciences” – see Dahms, “Carnap’s Early…”.
76 See Ádám Tamás Tuboly, “From the Jugendbewegung to the Aufbau – Carnap 
relation to Hans Freyer.” Forthcoming manuscript.
77 Freyer, Theory of…, 14. See also page 10. 
78 Freyer, Theory of…, 5. See also page 1.
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turalism (just like Carnap’s answer to the objectivity of knowledge 
was based on structuralism)79 and in fact, he claimed that if one 
is to know a geistiger Gegenstand then two minds are facing each 
other (the knower and the one made the object) and the condition 
of understanding is made possible by the identity of the (transcen-
dental) structures of minds. Furthermore, Freyer is working with a 
multilayered theory of knowledge and also his layers in the case of 
the geistige Gegenstände are similar to that of the later Aufbau.
The list could be continued; however, it seems to be plausible 
that, influenced by Dilthey, Freyer investigated the empirical access 
to the objects of the Geisteswissenschaften and he did not talk about 
the Neo-Kantians cultural sciences. But besides the comprehensive 
similarities between the Aufbau and the Theorie we know from the 
correspondence of Franz Roh and Wilhelm Flitner that Carnap and 
Freyer were considering a common project: 
It’s a pity that the expected program which C[arnap] were to (or 
had) reconcile with FREYER didn’t work out after all. From the 3 
big complexes in which we were involved to which shall we turn 
now? To politics? To Ethics? To the system of sciences? Freyer men-
tioned in a letter that we shall appreciate ethics and the value of 
science.80
In the light of their common interests and goals we could reconstruct 
the happenings of the 1920s as follows: though Carnap and Freyer 
did not work together each of them has done his part of the project 
separately in the Theorie and in the Aufbau.
79 On Carnap’s structuralism and its comprehensive effects and role in the 
Aufbau, see Christian Damböck, “Beyond Pure Structure: Hermeneutic 
Objectivity in Carnap’s Aufbau.” Forthcoming manuscript.
80 Quted by Priem and Glaser. Karin Priem and Edith Glaser, “‘Hochverehrter 
Herr Professor!’ – ‘Sehr geehrter Herr Kollege!’ Rekonstruktion von 
Erziehungswissenschaft durch Biographik am Beispiel der Korrespondenzen 
Eduard Sprangers und Wilhelm Flitners,” Zeitschrift für Erziehungswissenschaft 
2002, 1: 171. My translation.
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III. Summary
According to the usual story about Carnap, though his Aufbau 
was an important product of early analytic philosophy – due to 
his reductive empiricist tendencies – it showed the characteristic 
features of a failure. We have discussed several reasons to under-
mine this picture and consider the Aufbau in its original and much 
broader context.
If one characterizes Carnap’s work only in the framework of the 
received view she will miss something very important: namely its 
relation to the typical non-analytic, continental movements, such as 
Neo-Kantianism, phenomenology, the Geisteswissenschaften etc.
One final remark. If one aims at reconstructing the history of 
philosophy in the twentieth century, then in order to account for 
the development of both analytic philosophy and continental phi-
losophy, Carnap’s Aufbau seems to be a viable starting point since 
the continental roots of the Aufbau go much deeper than they are 
usually thought and this fact forces us to revise our frameworks and 
narratives.
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